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Practical reasoning as normative reasoning1 
 
The goal of my talk is twofold: in the first section I want to present some differences between 
reasons for and causes of actions. In the second section I want to shed some light on the na-
ture of practical reasoning and argue that practical reasoning is as logically conclusive as the-
oretical reasoning, but still another form of reasoning. 
 
I Differences between Reasons and Causes 
 
This is a difference Wittgenstein and his Ordinary Language Philosophy followers stressed in 
opposition to the positivistic account of explanation of human actions as specification of 
causes. The “causalistic account” of action seems to be the predominant account in analytical 
philosophy today and is also found often in scientific thinking, especially in neuroscience and 
the social sciences. It is a widespread thought that explanations of human actions involves 
reference to some mental, neurological or even social entities, processes or states that function 
as causes of human actions.  
In contrast, I want to argue, that if we explain human actions, be it those of others or of 
ourselves, we usually don’t present the causes of actions, may actions have causes or not. The 
type of answer which is mostly being asked for by “Why did S do this?” consists in giving 
reasons for acting. In fact, an item of behaviour can only count as an action only when it is 
possible in principle to give reasons for it, otherwise it would be mere behaviour. It has been 
objected by causalists of action, that reasons themselves can be understood as causes, most 
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prominently in D. Davidson’s paper “Actions, Reasons, Causes”2. The view that reasons are 
causes has become very influential among philosophers and scientists. 
However, it is misconceived to take reasons for causes. This misconception is fuelled by 
the wrong metaphysical picture that reasons are mental objects, statuses or events that drive a 
person to act or behave in a certain way – like a motor drives the parts of a machine. Here are 
some differences between reasons and causes as they have been identified by philosophers as 
Elizabeth Anscombe, Abraham Melden, William Dray, Alan White, Georg Henrik von 
Wright, Oswald Hanfling, Peter Hacker and others: 
1) We can know the reasons for our actions in a way in which we cannot know the causes 
of our actions or of our behaviour.3 When we act for reasons, we usually know these 
without having to observe ourselves or our body. This is different from caused behav-
iour. When our leg winces while we’re falling asleep then we don’t know the cause – 
unless we have investigated them as physiologists. But in order to identify the cause 
we would have to investigate our body or those of other humans. We could find out, 
for example: “Aha, every time this brain region was active, my leg winced after-
wards.” Not so for reasons: when we intend or want to go for a walk then we don’t 
come to know of it by observing our body and its behaviour. We don’t say: “Aha, eve-
ry time I wanted or intended to grab some fresh air, I was having a walk outside after-
wards.” 
2) Related to this is another difference between reasons and causes. Sometimes we ex-
plain our actions by our wants or desires. “Why did you eat all the cake?” “I desper-
ately wanted to” or “I had a desire to do so”. Now, we cannot describe these wants and 
desires independently of the action they are desires or wanting for.4 We have no other 
way of determining if someone has a want or desire to do X than to check if he does X 
when he has the opportunity to do so. The desire or want to do X is no mental or neu-
rological phenomenon the occurrence of which we could identify regardless of the 
very action the desire or want is about. This is not because our actual scientific inves-
tigation methods are still somewhat imperfect, but rather a matter of conceptual con-
nection: It just is part of the meaning of such expressions as “desire”, “want” or even 
“will” and “intention” to do X, that one does X if one has the opportunity to do so, i.e. 
one is able to do X and one is not prevented from doing X. We just wouldn’t not be-
                                                 
2
 Donald Davidson: "Actions, Reasons, and Causes", The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 60, No. 23, (1963), pp. 
685-700. 
3
 Anscombe 1957, § 8. 
4
 Melden 1961, ch. V, X, esp. p. 114.  
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lieve Peter when he said that he wants to travel to Jamaica but is never doing it, alt-
hough he is free to do so. So, wants and desires as reasons are not identifiable and not 
determinable without reference to the very action they are desires and wants for. In 
contrast, causes are mostly identifiable in a logically independent way from their ef-
fects. Before we have not seen a cause in operation, we cannot infer and predict its ef-
fect. Causal relations are contingent relations which are discovered a posteriori. A 
spark and the following explosion can be described independently of each other. But it 
is not possible to specify the wish or desire of someone as a wish or desire to do X 
without thereby refer to the action X. An action may count as an expression of a desire 
or a want, but effects cannot count as expressions of their causes.5 The relation be-
tween desires and the like and actions is therefore not one of contingency but of con-
ceptual connection. 
3) A third difference between reasons and causes is that reasons can be things in the fu-
ture while causes cannot occur after their effects.6 One can go to London to visit the 
Turner exhibition7 or get the ingredients in order to bake a cake tomorrow. But “to see 
the Turner exhibition” or “to bake a cake tomorrow” do no cause that I go to London 
or now buy the ingredients. Furthermore, something can count as a reason which in 
fact doesn’t even happen (the exhibition may be cancelled). Nonetheless, it remains a 
reason – whereas an effect cannot be caused by something that never takes place.8  
4) Another difference between reasons and causes is this:9 When we try to explain an ac-
tion and have found a convincing reason then the action is explained and our explana-
tion has come to an end. Not so with causes. When we explain a phenomenon by 
causes and finally found a cause, the causal research could go on and on – either to-
wards the causes of the causes or into the infinitesimal. After a causal relation between 
two events has been determined, it makes sense to investigate further what happens in 
particular between cause and effect and what exactly the mode of operation of the 
cause is that brings its effect into being. But nothing like this makes sense to investi-
gate between reasons and intentional actions. 
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 White 1967, p. 148. 
6
 Anscombe 1957, § 16. 
7
 Hacker 2010, ch. VIII.5. 
8
 Dray 1989, p. 473. 
9
 Dray 1957, ch. V.5. 
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5) Causes and reasons are different concepts because there are a number of predicates 
that can be ascribed to the one but not the other.10 Reasons for acting can be good or 
bad, selfish or altruistic, moral or immoral, childish or noble – but causes aren’t even 
the right kind of thing to which these predicates could be applied. Reasons can be 
convincing, excusatory, weighty, weak or unacceptable but there are no such things as 
convincing, excusatory, weighty, weak or unacceptable causes. A weighty cause may 
be an elephant that squashes a fruit under its foot but that would not be a weighty rea-
son. Furthermore, a certain fact may not have been the reason for which someone act-
ed but still it can be a reason of his acting. However, if a certain fact is not the cause 
of an effect, then it cannot be said that it is still a cause of the effect. 
6) Davidsons objection, that a reason can only count as a reason when it really effected 
the action is mistaken. Davidson says we can sometime be mistaken about our own 
reasons. Well, admittedly so, but to determine if a given reason was in fact the reason 
for which someone acted we don’t undertake special scientific investigations that let 
us discover hidden mental causes. What we do to find out if a given reason was in fact 
the reason a person acted for, is to look at the context of the action. We have to inquire 
if the person’s given reasons match their usual actions, what he did before and after 
the action. When Peter says that it was his patriotic concern for his homeland that he 
volunteered for the army, and we feel in doubt if it was not rather his concern for the 
good pay we have to think about how he else acted, i.e. if we knew him before as 
patriotric or as greedy and how he acted in comparable situations. We also would have 
to see how he will act in the future, especially in situations in which he has the oppor-
tunity to choose between patriotism and money. It is by this variety of factors that we 
determine which of some offered reasons is or was the real one, not by some neurolog-
ical research. So Davidson main objection against anti-causalism turns out to be none. 
Furthermore, Davidson misinterprets the relation between the premises and the con-
clusion of a practical syllogism as a causal relation between mental events. He takes 
reasons to be wantings and believings of the agent, not what the agent wants or be-
lieves.11 That is, Davidson thinks of reasons as a combined psychological state of 
wantings and believings. But reasons are facts, not our propositional attitude towards 
them. The reason to run off the street was that there was a truck coming, not my be-
lieving that there was a truck coming – although it was also necessary for me to be-
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 Hanfling 2000, ch. 13, “Explanation and justification”. Hacker 2010, ch. VII.5. 
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 Schroeder 2001, p. 150f. 
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lieve that there was a truck coming. But the latter is just a necessary condition for my 
reason, not the reason itself. Furthermore, when I weigh the reasons for and against a 
certain action, I am certainly not thinking about what will cause me to do or refrain 
from the action.12 
7) Causalists in action theory also have to deal with the problem of deviant causal chains 
to which to the present day no convincing solution has been put forward to my 
knowledge. 
 
 
II Practical reasoning as normative reasoning 
 
Let’s reflect further on the point that reasons can be acceptable or not. Reasons can justify 
actions – something causes aren’t even the right thing for. Causal explanations just tell us why 
something had as a matter of fact to happen. Reasons, however, can render actions as intelli-
gible or appropriate and the agent as rational – this is something causal explanations couldn’t 
possibly do. And to render an agent’s action as intelligible or appropriate is to characterize it 
as an action that should have been done or that was the right thing to do from the perspective 
of the agent under the given circumstances the agent found himself in. When we get to know 
the reasons for an action then we learn about the intentions, motives or principles of conduct 
of the agent. An action founded on reasons is an action which is in accordance with a goal, 
aim or purpose, i.e. something wanted, something considered to be (a) good. When we open 
an umbrella for the purpose of not getting wet in the rain, then our aim of “not getting wet” is 
something we consider to be good. What makes our action rational is that it can be derived 
from our given goal and the circumstances we believe we’re in.  
The rationalization or justification of an action can thus be displayed by a practical infer-
ence or practical syllogism. A practical syllogism in its most simple form consists of one 
premise that states an intention, goal or aim and another premise that states a corresponding 
means-ends-belief of an agent. For now, let’s consider first-person uses of practical syllo-
gisms. It is important to note, that the first premise is non-descriptivist in character, because 
the agent does not describe himself as someone who is having a certain intention or want. The 
agent doesn’t state or inform that he has found out that he has a certain intention. What can be 
stated is that what can be found out and discovered, what can be stated is that what may turn 
out to be wrong after some more investigation, what can be stated can be known or presumed. 
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 Hacker 2010, p. 226f. 
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But it makes no sense to say: “I thought I intended to do A, but now I see that I was mistaken” 
or “Either I want A or I want B – I have not found out yet”13 or “Are you sure your goal is to 
catch the train?” To say: “I have an intention” is not the same as to say “I have a (mental) 
object” which can be true or false, but serves as an expression of intention, a verbal manifes-
tation of an intention. Likewise, “I am going to take the dog for a walk” is not a prediction of 
what I am going to do in the near future, but the expression of an intention.  
There has been a dispute about the nature and correct formulation of a practical syllogism. 
Famously, a) Aristotle and Anscombe have pointed out that the conclusion of a practical syl-
logism is itself an action, and b) Anscombe also claims that practical reasoning is no form of 
“logical demonstration” as in a theoretical syllogism, because the premises don’t necessitate 
the conclusion. I think, these demands make practical syllogisms obscure, although both were 
after something right. I think, that if we understand the explanation of actions by reasons as 
normative in character these obscurities dissolve. This is what I want to show in the second 
part of may talk. 
Let’s first consider the second problem: Anscombe thinks of a practical syllogism as hav-
ing this form:14 
 
Wanted: that p 
If q, then p 
∴ Decision: q! 
 
Obviously, the conclusion of this syllogism is not necessitated by the premises, just as the 
conclusion of the following syllogism is not necessitated by its premises: 
 
p 
If q, then p 
∴ q 
 
Still, Anscombe thinks that practical syllogisms of the form just given are valid. But of course 
this is highly problematic:  
1) As I said, practical syllogisms may also serve as explanations. And explanations are 
just given when we can derive the explanandum from some premises. This means that 
                                                 
13
 Hacker 1996, ch. 5.6c). 
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 Anscombe 1974, p. 393. I simplify Anscombe’s account a little. 
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the explanandum must follow with necessity. As Anscombe herself notes, why else 
would we speak of a practical syllogism or inference at all? She says if there is some-
thing like a practical syllogism then there must be something like its validity.15 But she 
says that practical inferences are only valid in a derivative, non-formal sense, one that 
doesn’t involve necessity.16 But I am afraid such a concept of non-necessitating validi-
ty is not available: The concept of validity of a syllogism is defined and dependent on 
the basis of the concept of necessity, for validity is defined as: “If one accepts the 
premises then one must accept the conclusion (otherwise you would be committing an 
error)”.17 So practical syllogisms have to be taken as syllogisms that necessitate their 
conclusions. 
2) Of course, a practical syllogism in its Anscombean form is not valid in this sense. But 
that’s simply because its second premise represents only a sufficient condition for the 
goal, not a necessary one. We have to be aware of the difference, as has been rightly 
pointed out by Richard Hare.18 For a practical syllogism to be logically valid, the sec-
ond premise must state a necessary condition of the goal to be achieved, so that the 
syllogism will e.g. look like this: 
 
Wanted: that p 
Unless q, then not-p 
∴ Decision: q! 
 
 And this inference will be as valid as the assertoric inference 
 
p 
If not-q, then not-p 
∴ q 
 
because by contraposition “If not-q, then not-p” is equivalent to “If p, then q”. We 
shouldn’t therefore conclude that practical inferences are only valid either in a deriva-
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 Anscombe 1974, p. 377. 
16
 Anscombe 1974, p. 394. 
17
 This is not to say that it is as a matter of fact impossible that someone accepts the premises but fails to accept 
the conclusion, but only that he should accept the conclusion if he accepts the premises – for him to be con-
sistent. The logical “must” is normative, not psychological. 
18
 Hare 1969. Hare 1969, p. 60-62 points out that also Aristotle did not give adequate attention to the distinction 
between necessary and sufficient conditions in practical reasoning.  
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tive sense or valid only according to a different kind of logic.19 Furthermore, any prac-
tical inference which states only a sufficient condition in its second premise would 
simply deliver an incomplete explanation.20 Let me refer to one of Anscombe’s exam-
ples:21 That Mary went to Hereford, is only explained by Mary’s wanting a jersey cow 
and her knowing that they sell jersey cows in Hereford, when we add that they sell jer-
sey cows only in Hereford or that Mary also wanted a jersey cow as fast as possible 
and that going to Hereford was the fastest way to get a jersey cow. But with these 
amendments we turn the sufficient condition of the second premise of the syllogism to 
a necessary one. 
I take it then, that conclusions of practical inferences follow with necessity, when properly 
formulated.  
Let’s now consider Aristotle’s and Anscombe’s claim, that it is an action that follows 
from a practical syllogism. With this claim they want to emphasize the principal difference of 
practical from theoretical reasoning. A practical syllogism is not the reasoning towards “the 
truth of a conclusion”, as Anscombe puts it.22 To insist on this is basically right, but nonethe-
less the demand that the conclusion is to be understood as the action itself is at best obscure. 
A syllogism, it will be remembered, is something expressable in language and so for its parts. 
The conclusion of a syllogism cannot be an action as much as it cannot be a banana, since a 
non-linguistic entity cannot possibly stand in any entailment relation to premises.23  
On the other hand, the conclusion of a practical syllogism certainly is not a proposition, if 
we take “proposition” here to mean “statement”. For by the conclusion of a practical syllo-
gism in the first person form I am not describing anything. I don’t state that as a matter of fact 
I have decided to do X nor do I predict that I am going to do X. Conclusions of practical syl-
logisms are not truth apt. Anscombe might have thought that logical validity of a syllogism 
requires that the value of truth is preserved from the premises to the conclusion. And since a 
practical syllogism is not one in which truth is preserved, the conclusion for her could not be 
a statement at all. But that that the conclusion is no statement, doesn’t mean it cannot be a 
form of language at all. 
                                                 
19
 The latter has been put forward by Anthony Kenny with his “logic of satisfactoriness”. Cf. Hare 1969, p. 64f. 
Anscombe 1974, p. 385f. 
20
 As has been rightly pointed out by von Wright 1989, p. 822f. Accordingly, von Wright 1971, ch. III.4 and 
throughout chose the “unless-form” of the second premise for his formulation of a practical syllogism. 
21
 Anscombe 1957, § 34. 
22
 Anscombe 1974, p. 395. Cf. Anscombe 1957, p. 58. 
23
 Black 1974, p. 408f. 
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In order to get some clarity about the nature of the conclusion of a practical syllogism we 
should follow the suggestion made by Richard Hare, to construe practical syllogisms as im-
perative syllogisms. The first premise of a practical syllogism according to Hare consists in a 
sentence which prescriptive use is made of. This means that it is uttered as an imperative 
speech act. Imperatives cannot be true or false, but one can subscribe to or commit oneself to 
an imperative – as well as one can subscribe to or commit oneself to a statement. The second 
premise states a necessary condition to fulfil the first premise.24 Taken conjunctively, both 
premises yield an imperative conclusion to which the agent must subscribe as well, if he 
wants to be consistent. In this syllogism not truth, but the more general notion of subscrip-
tion25 or commitment is preserved from the premises to the conclusion. 
But is it legitimate to understand a practical syllogism as an imperative syllogism? I think 
so. First, even Anscombe herself said that the first premise of a practical syllogism contains 
evaluative notions like “should” or “appropriate”.26 And evaluative language is imperative in 
character, because it would be contradictory to say “You should do X, but don’t do it!”. Sec-
ond: I already suggested, how the purpose stating premise can be understood as stating some-
thing good or something that should be achieved from the perspective of the agent. Purposes 
and goals can be taken as things which are judged by the agent to be pursued by him. The 
only cases in which someone could say: “This is my goal / purpose / intention – but I should 
not pursue it” are cases in which the speaker does not use “should” prescriptively, but only 
descriptively. The only sense one could make out of his remark is to assume that whatever he 
intends or his purpose is, is not as a matter of fact in accordance with what is commonly 
judged as something that should be done. It is as if he says “This is my goal, but according to 
the mainstream opinion I should not pursue it”. But he cannot sincerely say in the full fledged, 
prescriptive sense: “This is my purpose – but I should not pursue it” for this would be again 
self-contradictory. Third, it is also practical reasoning, when we reflect upon what we must do 
in order to comply with a demand given by some other person. Remember Anscombe’s fa-
mous example of the man with the shopping list. Anscombe herself says, that when the man 
wrote the shopping list himself, it fulfils the role of an expression of intention, when his wife 
                                                 
24
 Strictly spoken Hare never presents a practical syllogism with a second premise in the “unless”-form. Hares 
examples of practical syllogisms consist of a prescriptive, universal first premise and a descriptive, particular 
second premise, the conclusion being prescriptive and particular. In this way Hare secures the logical validity of 
practical syllogisms. It is von Wright 1971, p. 96 who presents practical syllogisms with second premises in the 
“unless”-form. As Hare 1969, p. 60 rightly notes, particular prescriptions are necessary conditions of the ful-
filling of universal prescriptions. One could say that the unless-form is more general, because it not only applies 
to PS with universal premises. 
25
 Hare 1952, p. 191. Hare 1984, p. 70f. 
26
 Anscombe 1957, § 35. In § 14 Anscombe mentions that in backward-looking motives the notions of „good“ 
and „harm“ are involved. 
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wrote the shopping list for him, then the list fulfils the role of a command.27 And in both cases 
the decisive difference of this list’s non-descriptivistic role to the descriptivist role of the list 
of the detective, is sustained. 
It therefore seems to me to be legitimate to understand a practical syllogism which is for-
mulated with the notions of purpose or intention as an imperative syllogism. Intentions can be 
understood as self-prescriptions in this context. Admittedly, this might be seen as a little bit 
artificial, but it’s harmless. I take it then that a practical syllogism can in principle be con-
strued as an imperative syllogism, the form which may be given as: 
 
Y should be brought about  
Unless one does X, Y will not be brought about 
∴ X should be brought about  
 
or even as: 
 
Bring about Y 
Unless you do X, Y will not be brought about 
∴ Bring about X. 
 
Now, as already mentioned, the validity of a syllogism like this is accounted for by demand-
ing that validity here has to be understood in terms of subscription or commitment to the 
premises and the conclusion, not truth – so that it can be said, that whoever subscribes to the 
premises, must also subscribe to the conclusion. Of course, subscription to the first premise is 
something different from the subscription to the second, since the first is in the imperative 
mood and the second is in the indicative mood. Nonetheless, both premises taken together 
necessitate the conclusion, for if someone subscribes to or commits himself to the premises 
but not to the conclusion then its safe to blame him for not having understood the meaning of 
at least one of the premises, be it the indicative or the imperative one. The logic of such an 
imperative syllogism is isomorphic to that of ordinary assertoric logic.28 
                                                 
27
 Anscombe 1957, § 32. 
28
 Anscombe 1957, p. 59 explicitly rejects the form of a practical syllogism as an imperative inference, but for a 
spurious argument. Her discomfort with the first, universal premise can be easily resolved when it’s made more 
specific and reformulated as “Do everything conducive to not having a car crash and get to your destination”. 
Later her discomfort with the imperative form of the practical syllogism is that it allows inferences of the sort: p! 
∴ (p or q)! (Anscombe 1974, p. 386). But Hare 1967 already showed how this paradox (“Ross’ paradox”) and 
other alleged objections against the isomorphism of imperative and assertoric logic can be fully resolved. 
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So, if we make prescriptive use of the conclusion “I should do X”, i.e. subscribe to it, then 
we treat the conclusion in a way in which it implies the command spoken to oneself “Do X” 
or “Let me do X”. To be sincerely committed to “I should do X” just means to do X, when 
one has the opportunity to do so. To really make prescriptive use of the conclusion of a prac-
tical inference is to follow it and execute the action in question as soon as one is able to do so. 
This seems to me to be the intimate connection between the premises of a practical inference 
and the concluding action. But again, the conclusion cannot be the action itself, for inferences 
are linguistic in character. 
To conceive of a practical syllogism like this also helps to resolve a worry that Aristotle 
still seemed to have about the necessity of practical inferences. It is as if Aristotle thought that 
the conclusion of a practical syllogism might sometimes not follow by necessity because an 
agent might be akratic, i.e. to have a weakness of will that hinders him to execute the action 
although he affirms the premises.29 Again Hare’s distinction between descriptive and pre-
scriptive use is helpful here: If an agent subscribes to the premises of a PS but still doesn’t act 
in accordance to the conclusion, then its safe to be said that he did not make prescriptive use 
of it. It rather is as if he just paid a lip service to the conclusion “I should do Y” or “Let me 
bring about Y”, such that he is not sincere about it. There is no such thing as a weakness of 
will, there are just people who are sincere in their subscriptions and those who are not.30 
The demand that a prescription follows with necessity from a set of mixed prescriptive and 
descriptive premises as long as the logic is in order is in perfect accordance with the point 
mentioned above (I.2), that we have no other way of determining if an agent in fact has a cer-
tain intention or not, than to check if he would act in accordance to his intention. The notion 
of intention is conceptually connected with the action itself, there’s no independent way of 
identifying an intention apart from the corresponding action. 
This intimate connection between the conclusion of a practical syllogism and the action it-
self might be what Anscombe and Aristotle had in fact in mind although it was misleading of 
them to insist that practical syllogisms have an action as conclusion. What distinguishes prac-
tical thinking from theoretical is not their logic, which can be taken as be perfectly isomorphic 
to assertoric logic, but the fact that the first premise and the conclusion are non-descriptive, 
namely prescriptive in character. A practical syllogism is analogous to an imperative infer-
                                                 
29
 Cf. Black, 1974, p. 411. Von Wright 1971, ch. III.8 thought that for similar reasons, although he later in 
Wright 1984, p. 222f. changed his mind about this. Aristotle in NE, 1147a23-b1 holds that practical syllogisms 
in their variant with a universal praemissa major necessitate the action. 
30
 Hare 1962, ch. 5. 
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ence and that what makes it a practical inference, but it still is a logical inference in the ordi-
nary sense of the word. 
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